Human capital not only generates market income but is a direct source of utility as well. The interaction between the non-economic motive for e¤ort and the standard economic motive can generate multiple stationary solutions for individual household optimization. Depending on the initial distribution of skills, this multiplicity divides each group of otherwise identical households into two perpetually separated groups: one rich and educated, one poor and uneducated. If the rich have an interest in the education of the poor, polarized equilibria are typically Pareto-ine¢ cient.
Introduction
Most people value their own human capital beyond its role in generating income. While standard economic models recognize the role of human capital as an asset yielding a return by its capacity to increase wages, they generally do not focus on its role as a direct source of utility. In contrast, the present paper treats human capital as a direct source of utility. An individual exerts costly e¤ort to accumulate human capital not only to generate higher future income and consumption (the economic motive) but also because of the direct utility e¤ect of increased human capital (the non-economic motive). The contribution of this paper is twofold: First, to show that the interaction of these motives naturally leads to the existence of multiple stationary solutions to the individual optimization problem. Second, to provide a rational for tax systems with negative marginal taxes on low incomes.
Besides introducing human capital into the felicity function, this study retains standard assumptions of a canonical intertemporal household problem: Human capital generates income, whereas e¤ort raises the stock of human capital and reduces felicity. The interpretation of human capital is inspired by psychology literature concerning human needs and subjective well-being. I argue that the conclusions of this literature support the following general assumptions: 1. The felicity function is additively separable with respect to consumption and human capital 2. The marginal utility of consumption decreases with increased consumption (Inada-conditions satis…ed) 3. The marginal utility of human capital is neither particularly high at a low human capital nor does it decline as human capital rises (Inada-conditions violated) . Within the simplest class of optimization problems that satisfy these requirements, multiple stationary solutions exist whenever the marginal utility of consumption is suf-…ciently small compared to the marginal disutility of e¤ort at low consumption, while the marginal utility of human capital remains su¢ ciently large at higher levels. There is a threshold skill level:
Households endowed with initial human capital below this level choose a path of increasing passivity and sustained poverty. Households endowed with initial human capital above the threshold, motivated both by economic and non-economic rewards, choose a path that leads to sustained activity, high skills, and income.
The multiplicity of stationary optima is a potential source of persistent inequality among inherently identical agents (e.g., equal except for initial skill). This result is concurrent with the large amount of literature on credit constraints and inequality, where inequality persists due to capital market imperfections. According to this literature, unskilled households remain unskilled because they cannot …nance today's education using loans they would pay back their future increased income. The present paper does not account for physical capital or credit markets. However, self-…nancing constraints are not the reason for low-skill traps or segregation (the set of stationary optimum is robust with respect to the introduction of a perfect credit market). The reason is rather that skill cannot be bought, whether it be by current income, a money transfer, savings, or a loan. In case of multiple solutions to the household problem, low-skilled households do not raise their human capital because it is too di¢ cult rather than too expensive. By reducing the marginal utility of consumption, an unconditional transfer undermines poor households'motivation to educate themselves. It turns any active low-skill household into an inactive household. In contrast, if it were credit constraints that caused the low-skill trap, the household would use a transfer to increase its human capital.
When simple unconditional transfers accentuate skill segregation, it seems natural to condition transfers upon the economic activity of the household. Indeed, many countries add economic activity incentives to their tax-transfer systems. 1 Surprisingly few theoretical models provide a rational for such schemes. 2 Once one recognizes the possibility of path dependent individually optimal e¤ort and human capital accumulation, there emerges a wealth of arguments supporting activating welfare schemes and, in particular, for negative marginal income tax rates on low incomes. A particularly strong case for such schemes arises if one adds to the individual household problem described above a common interest in the education of the poor, shared also by the rich. Conditional redistribution then tends to Pareto-dominate non-redistributional tax systems. In the present paper such a common interest is generated by the presence of a public good: The larger the number of …nancially strong households that can participate in …nancing the public good, the better it is for each individual contributor. The rich are only willing to …nance transitory transfers if this guarantees the education of the poor su¢ ciently quickly. If the willingness to pay is strong enough to compensate for the poor's disutility of the e¤ort necessary to raise their skill, then polarization is Pareto-ine¢ cient. The present paper shows that (in the presence of public goods) their exist tax-transfer schemes involving a negative marginal income tax for the initially unskilled that Pareto-improve any persistently polarized equilibrium.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the individual optimiza-1 In particular, many countries have recently adopted negative marginal tax rates into their tax-transfer systems:
the United States (earned income tax credit), the United Kingdom (working tax credit), Canada (working income tax bene…t), Germany (combined wages), Ireland, New Zealand, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France or the Netherlands. Some (notably Scandinavian) countries already have a tradition of activating welfare or "workfare". 2 In the framework of Mirrlees'seminal article (Mirrlees [1971] ) and most subsequent literature on optimal taxation, marginal income tax rates are always non-negative. An exception is Diamond [1980] , who shows that if, instead of considering the intensive margin of labor choices, one considers the extensive margin (an individual worker faces the binary choice of working or not), negative marginal income tax rates can be optimal (see also Saez [2002] , Choné and Laroque [2005] , Laroque [2005] ). Beaudry et al. [2009] deviate from the Mirrlees framework by assuming that the government is uninformed both about households'value of time in economic and non-economic activities and by allowing the government to condition not only on total incomes but also on individual wage rates. Beaudry et al. show that an optimal tax-transfer includes a negative marginal tax rate for workers with a wage below a certain cuto¤ rate.
2 tion problem Section 3 determined the conditions leading to multiplicity of stationary optima. Section 4 studies the e¤ect of simple transfers, while Section 5 shows that, in the presence of public goods, conditional transfers can Pareto-improve any persistently polarized allocation. In the long-run the Pareto-improving allocation constructed (and implemented) in Section 5 generates equal skill (and felicity) for intrinsically equal agents (i.e. for agents that only di¤er with respect to initial skill. Section 6 …rst discusses the basic assumptions leading to the multiplicity of stationary solutions to the individual optimization problem at the core of the present paper (Section 6.1). Second, it shows that this multiplicity is robust with respect to the removal of credit market imperfections (Section 6.2). Third, section 6.3 discusses the possibility of addressing the issue of activating welfare from a (generalized) utilitarian perspective. Section 7 concludes and argues that the path dependence of individual skill accumulation can explain the popularity of conditional transfers even in the absence of public goods.
The individual household problem
The individual household solves
c t = wh t for all t 0
given h 0 and fG t g 1 t=0 .
where c t (consumption) and x t (e¤ort) are control variables and h t is a state variable (human capital).
G t is the amount of the (non-rival) public good consumed, which in the laissez-faire economy is zero or exogenous to the individual household. Household income wh t depends on the household's skill and the general productivity level w. In the absence of credit markets the household simply consumes his current income (c t = wh t ).
The instantaneous utility function is speci…ed as
where measures the strength of the economic motive for exerting e¤ort, while b measures the intensity of the non-economic motive. a and measure the cost of e¤ort, where > 0 ensures the concavity of v(x); which is necessary for the existence of a solution to (1). Note that if fG t g 1 t=0 is exogenous for the individual household, it does not a¤ect the solution of (1), even if > 0.
The skill accumulation function is
where measures the e¤ectiveness of the e¤orts to increase skills, given the current level of skill.
measures depreciation of human capital. I assume that is su¢ ciently large given ; a; ; : 3
The very fact that h enters the utility function, as well as the speci…c way it does so, may need particular justi…cation. The former because it is unconventional, the latter because it is crucial for the results. Section 6.1 therefore provides some motivation for this paper's interpretation of h and the speci…c functional forms (2) and (3).
History-dependent optimal individual behavior
The section …rst solves the individual optimization problem (1) for an exogenously given path fG t g 1 t=0 , which does not a¤ect optimal individual behavior. Lemma 1 …rst provides the common structure of the solution for all parameter combinations. The interplay of the standard terms m(c) and v(x) with the non-standard term f (h) = b h in the optimization problem (1) gives rise to three cases, that are separately addressed in three propositions 2-4 below.
Lemma 1 The …rst order conditions of (1) together with the accumulation rule (3) de…ne the dynamic system 8 <
:
The two isoclines are 8 <
Depending on parameter values the system has no, one or two strictly positive stationary solutions.
In addition there always is a trivial stationary state at h = 0. In all cases the maximization problem
(1) has a unique solution fx(h t ); h t g t 0 for any initial h 0 , where x(h) is a continuous policy function.
Proof:
The …rst order conditions of (1). The current value Hamiltonian of (1) is H(x; h; G; ) = m(wh) + bh v (x) + (G) + ( x h)h: Existence of an inner solution to max x H(x; h; G; ) requires
Together with the accumulation rule for human capital this 3 Formally, > ( a ) 8 = 2 will ensure that the unstable stationary solution in the threshold case is a node. 4 de…nes the dynamic system 8 <
With v(x) = ax + 2 x 2 two isoclines are 8 <
Inserting m(c) = ln c yields (5).
Stationary solutions. The two isoclines always have an intersection at h = 0 de…ning the trivial stationary state of (4). The other stationary states are determined by the solutions to
With C := a , B := b a , and D = 2 > 0 the (non-zero) stationary states of (4) are the solutions to
Equation (8) may have no, one or two strictly positive solutions
Case 1 One strictly positive solution h = B+ p B 2 +4DC 2D
> 0 if C > 0 or equivalently > a . In this case x _ x=0 (0) = a > x _ h=0 (0) = 0 as in Figures 1a and 1b , such that the two isoclines have exactly one intersection at a strictly positive h, say h > 0:
0) and the _ x = 0-isocline is rising su¢ ciently fast compared with the _ h = 0-isocline as in Figure 2 , such that there are two strictly positive intersections, h th > 0 and h > h th .
Case 3 No strictly positive solution. If x _ x=0 (0) < x _ h=0 (0) and the _ x = 0-isocline is not rising fast with h as in Figure 3 , then there are no positive intersections.
Case 3b Two negative solutions if B 2 4D < C < 0 and B < 0.
Stability of the solutions and existence of a continuous policy function. Appendix 8.1
shows that h 1 is unstable (whenever it exists, thus in Case 2) and h 2 is saddle-point stable (whenever it exists, thus in Cases 1 and 2). The trivial stationary state (h ; x ) is unstable in Case 1 and is a saddle point stable in Cases 2 and 3. Furthermore it is shown that any path satisfying (4) and
converging to one of the three possible stationary solutions (including these stationary solutions) satisfy the transversality condition. Hartl et al. [2004] show that the there exists a continuos policy function through all stationary states, in all three cases, if in Case 2 with three stationary solutions (h = 0 < h 1 < h 2 ), the unstable stationary solution lies in the concave domain of the Hamiltonian.
Appendix 8.1 shows that this condition is met if is su¢ ciently large (as assumed in footnote 3).
Intuition for equations (4) and (5).
Most of the ideas and results in this article can be understood by studying (4) 
To gain an intuition for the behavior of _ 
if (x t ; h t ) lies above (below) the above _ x = 0-isocline as indicated by the corresponding arrows in the phase-diagrams (see for instance Figure 1 ). 4 More precisely, the cost of additional e¤ort today consists in direct cost vx of exerting e¤ort at t rather than at t + plus the cost of reduced skill at t + by depreciation. One unit of additional e¤ort either at t or at t + produces h units of additional skill. If they are produced at t rather than at t + , the skill at t + is smaller then when already produced at t by h 2 : This must be evaluated at the shadow price t ' t+ , which is t = vx h (see Appendix 8.1). Thus the cost of exerting e¤ort today due to depreciation is t h 2 = vx h .
6
The exact position of the _ x = 0-isocline depends on the parameters (which change from case to case) and on the economic environment (which change from section to section). Raising the economic motive, by raising the marginal utility m h = =h for each h, raises the bene…t from exerting e¤ort today rather than tomorrow. Using the above intuition, this shifts upward the _ x = 0-isocline. This will play a crucial role throughout the paper. In particular public policy will reduce (by transfers) or raise (by negative marginal taxes) the incentive to exert e¤ort through its impact on m h . Similarly an increase of (more e¢ cient learning) or a reduction in a (lower disutility of e¤ort) shift upward the _ x = 0-isocline for any h 0. In contrast, raising b (stronger non-economic motive) raises the incentive to exert e¤ort today only for strictly positive h and does so the stronger, the larger h. An increase in b therefore raises the slope of the _ x = 0-isocline without a¤ecting its intercept x _ x=0 (h = 0). This re ‡ects the Maslow hierarchy (see Section 6): The relative importance of the non-economic motive is negligible for small wh and rises with wh.
Case 1 arises if the economic motive is very strong (large m h = =h given ; , a, h). The household is active at any level of skill, irrespective of the strength of the non-economic motive (b). Case 3 arises when both motives for e¤ort are weak (small and b). These two cases describe the range of possible solutions to the standard household problem in the absence of any non-economic motive (b = 0). The interesting threshold Case 2 occurs when the economic motive is not very strong (small ), while the non-economic motive is large (large b). A low-skill household remains low skilled (because the non-economic reward is relatively small even with large b). A highly skill household remains highly skilled (because of the strong non-economic motive).
Case 1, Strong economic motive, high e¢ ciency of learning, low discounting: Activation.
Proposition 2 If the economic motive is su¢ ciently strong (Case 1), then the optimization problem
(1) has a unique non-trivial stationary solution h > 0; which is a global attractor. Formally: If > a = , then lim t!1 h t = h > 0 for all h 0 > 0. See Figure 1 .
> a whenever the economic motive for e¤ort is strong ( large), the household is patient ( small), it is easy to raise h ( large) or the simple cost of e¤ort is low (a small). As a short-cut, I will say in this case that the "economic motive for e¤ort is strong".
Proof. Corollary of Lemma 1. If > a (Case 1), then x _ x=0 (0) = a > x _ h=0 (0) = 0 as in Figures 1a and 1b then the two isoclines have exactly one intersection at a strictly positive h, say h > 0: Note that for this case, at least qualitatively, it is irrelevant whether x _ x=0 (h) is increasing (as in Figure 1a ) or decreasing (as in Figure 1b ).
Case 2, Weak economic motive, strong non-economic motive: threshold dynamics
Case 1b Proposition 3 If the economic motive is not dominant and the non-economic motive is su¢ ciently strong (Case 2), then the optimal policy has a threshold above which human capital converges to a large stationary state and below which human capital converges to a low stationary state. Formally:
Asymptotically the initially unskilled (and poor) completely lose their skill and income because both their economic and non-economic motive is small (small and small h;respectively). The initially su¢ ciently skilled converge to a high level h of human capital and income wh because their noneconomic motive is strong (large b and h).
Proof. Corollary of Lemma 1. If x _ x=0 (0) < x _ h=0 (0) and the _ x = 0-isocline rises su¢ ciently fast compared with the _ h = 0-isocline as in Figure 2 , then the two functions of (5) have two strictly positive at h = 0 is saddle point stable and among all paths satisfying (4) only those indicated by the dotted saddle path in Figure 3 satisfy the transversality condition.
Proposition 9 in Appendix 8.1 shows that if the non-economic motive is su¢ ciently strong, the three cases shown in 1 to 3 can be generated by a shift of the cost of e¤ort a. Essentially it is shown that for su¢ ciently large b, if a is increased from a su¢ ciently low to a su¢ ciently high level, then the _ x = 0-isocline is shifted down to generate the three …gures 1, 2 and 3).
Polarization and simple transfers
Consider an economy with mass 1 of identical households (up to initial skill) that satisfy the conditions of Case 2 (Proposition 3). n u agents start with human capital below the individual threshold (h i 0 < h th for i 2 [0; n u ]) and n s = 1 n u households start above the threshold (h i 0 > h th for i 2 [n u ; 1]). After a while the n s households initially above the threshold will cluster in the neighborhood of the stable attracting steady state h while the others will have lost much of their initial human capital.
The inequality that occurs with such polarization would call for redistribution from rich to poor in most industrial countries. The present section studies the e¤ect of a simple unconditional transfer on the behavior of the bene…ciary. The conclusions of the present section do not depend on the motives of the funding party.
What happens if a household with low human capital and correspondingly low income is paid a transfer M ensuring a minimal standard of living?
Proposition 5 If in the absence of transfers, an agent is in Case 1, then any transfer introduces a threshold level h th (M ) > 0, such that if initial skill h 0 < h th (M ) the agent reduces his e¤ ort and will asymptotically lose all his skill. The agent will have enough to eat (his life-time utility at t = 0 is raised) but remains uneducated. If without transfer, the agent was already in Case 2, then the transfer raises the threshold ability h th (M ) and raises it the more, the larger the transfer (h th (M ) increasing).
The transfer can therefore prevent economic and personal emancipation towards high skill and income. Unskilled but patient and motivated households, initially in Case 1 (Figure 4 ), which would have liberated themselves from poverty and low skill, are enticed to passivity and will remain unskilled in the presence of transfers.
Proof sketch. For simplicity assume that the group eligible for social transfer payments are exempted from any (further) tax. 5 The individual household problem (1) is therefore unchanged 5 The model can for instance be closed by introducing a constant marginal labor income tax to balance government budget. The individual budget constraint becomes c i t = Tt + wh i t = Tt + (1 ) e wh i t , where e w is the gross wage per labor e¢ ciency unit, is the tax rate on labor income, w = (1 ) e w is the after tax wage. Government budget is balanced :
The essential di¤erence to the system without the transfer is that x _ x=0 (0; M ) = a < 0 = x _ h=0 (0) for any M > 0 independent of the strength of the economic and non-economic motives of e¤ort. As a consequence Case 1 is not possible if M > 0. Recall that already in the baseline model (with M = 0) the non-economic motive was too weak to justify the e¤ort necessary for activation at low h. Given the low absolute e¤ectiveness of e¤ort at small h 
so that if all other households are at steady state, then Tt = e wt R 1 0 h i t di is constant and the individual household problem is the same as before, where now w = (1 ) e w.
A Samaritan' s Dilemma Proposition 5 does not depend on the source of the transfers or on the motivation of the contributors. Suppose that, starting at a polarized equilibrium, a hypothetical social planner or a real government wants to raise both the disposable income and the skills of the poor. If simple transfers were the only available policy, this double aim of feeding and activating would establish an unsolvable dilemma for the government, a version of the "Samaritan's Dilemma":
An unconditional transfer alleviates the material misery of the poor and unskilled but at the same time reduces their material motivation to exert e¤ort and thus tends to perpetuate low skills and low earnings. Even worse, the low skill households that would actively raised themselves from poverty in the absence of the transfer will now be passive. The transfer can only mitigate the current misery of the poor by at the same time reducing the likelihood that they will become skilled and self-reliant.
unskilled, it should be low enough to be worth …nancing by the contributors. They have to be compensated by a su¢ cient increase of the public good (or reduction of their own tax bill) in the su¢ ciently near future.
As in Section 4, consider an economy with mass 1 of identical households (up to initial skill). A measure of n s agents start with high initial skill h i 0 = h s 0 > 0 for i 2 [n u ; 1] and a measure of n u agents start with low initial skill
wh u 0 for all t 0: Note that this de…nition does not depend on the economic environment under which the allocation occurs, e.g. on the the tax-scheme or public-good funding system that may be in e¤ect.
The per capita cost of providing one unit of the public good is one unit of the consumption good. Furthermore, to focus attention on an environment in which the already activated skilled are willing to pay transfers for a while if this leads to the activation of the initially unskilled, I assume throughout this section, that the public good is su¢ ciently attractive ( su¢ ciently large) and that the initially skilled are su¢ ciently skilled (h s 0 su¢ ciently large). These two assumptions are quanti…ed in Appendix 8.3.2 in terms of exogenous parameters (see (28) and (29)). The conditions are less restrictive than the corresponding conditions generating persistent polarization in the basic model (conditions of Proposition 3 guaranteeing existence of a threshold h th and h u 0 < h th < h s 0 ).
Theorem 6 Every feasible persistently polarized allocation z = fc i t ; x i t ; h i t ; G t g i2fu,sg;t 0 is Pareto-ine¢ cient.
Proof: Corollary of Theorem 7 below.
Implementation

Preview
Theorem 7 (Section 5.2.3) will show that there exists a tax-transfer function implementing a Paretoimproving allocation e z upon any persistently polarized initial allocation. Before turning to a more formal statement and a complete proof of the theorem, I sketch how the proposed tax-transfer scheme satis…es the three above requirements (a)-(c):
(a) Activation. The tax-transfer scheme has to provide the incentive for the unskilled to exert enough e¤ort to raise their human capital. The scheme proposed in Section 5.2.3 does so by raising the elasticity := dy u d is (y) dy y y u d is (y) of disposable income y u dis (y) with respect to pre-tax income y = wh above 1. To see how this activates, remember that a rise in the marginal utility m h , generated for instance by a rise in (the parameter measuring the economic motive), shifts up the _ x = 0-isocline.
Suppose that is su¢ ciently small (and b su¢ ciently large) to generate the threshold case depicted in Thus y u dis > y u for low h. Together with > 1 (large m h ) this leads to a negative marginal tax: 1
Activation plus transfer thus requires a negative marginal income tax.
Note that the initial transfer to the unskilled need not be very large to grant their approval to an activating if their initial h u 0 is small (If not, wait with the beginning of the welfare program unit h u t is su¢ ciently small, which must eventually occur since at any polarized allocation h u t ! 0). (c) Approval by the skilled. Together with the fact that the disposable income y u dis guaranteed in (b) can be relatively small, (a) creates a favorable environment also to satisfy (c): A large elasticity of disposable income y u dis (y) will make sure that the skill and pre-tax income y u of the u is larger than a small guaranteed y u dis su¢ ciently soon. Once this is the case, the initial investment of the contributors can in principle start to pay a return. The proposed tax-transfer scheme will pay this return in terms of public good contributions, a currency which in the present setting is particularly valuable to rich contributors (large h s ) with a high valuation of the public good (large ) (since the marginal felicity of private consumption is declining, while that of a coordinated increase of the public good is not).
The particular scheme proposed in Theorem 7 ceases to arti…cially force the initially unskilled agents into high e¤ort, when this is no longer required. After a transitory period of transfers and activation, 
De…nition and auxiliary welfare concepts
This section formally de…nes the notion of implementation and solves the utilitarian welfare problem.
To further prepare the complete proof of Theorem 7 it introduces a second auxiliary concept, intragroup symmetric optimum, which will serve as a benchmark for each group k 2 fu; sg to be beaten by the Pareto-improving allocation e z and also describes the behavior of the s during the transitory period of activation. 
Appendix 8.3.1 shows that under the assumptions of su¢ ciently large h s 0 and ; the solution to this problem …xes consumption at the same constant value c i t = for all agents. Correspondingly public good provision is G t = wh t . Furthermore (for su¢ ciently large h 0 s and ), the 'dynamic problem' of choosing fx i t ; h i t g i;t can be decomposed into independent optimization problems for each i (Case (ii) in Appendix 8.3.1). For each of these problems (e.g. for each i) there exists a threshold value h th ut > 0 and a h ut > h th ut such that lim t!1 h t = 0 for all h 0 < h th ut and lim t!1 h t = h * ut for all h 0 > h th ut (see Figure 5 ). In particular, the two isoclines generated by the FOCs of (11) are 8 <
: When raising b or , the _ x = 0-isocline (12) rotates upward (see Figure 5 ) , such that the individual threshold h th ut (the inner stationary optimum h ut ) of the utilitarian problem is decreasing (increasing) not only with respect to the strength of the non-economic motive but also with respect to the preference for the public good. 6
As has been noted, the allocation constructed in the proof of Theorem 7 will implement the equal-weight utilitarian solution after a transitory period of activation (i.e. at t T ). Applying the equal-weight utilitarian solution immediately (i.e. at t 0 rather than at t T ) does not activate the unskilled (for small h u 0 ) and can therefore not Pareto-improve over a persistently polarized initial allocation. See Section 6 for a further discussion of utilitarian welfare. 
At equilibrium with
The intra-group symmetric solution A second auxiliary solution concept that will be used in the proof of Theorem 7 de…nes a benchmark z 0k for each group k 2 fu; sg to be beaten by the Pareto-improving allocation e z. From the perspective of the initially skilled (the s), the best possible polarized allocation z s0 to be beaten by e z is their preferred intra-group symmetric allocation given the maximal public good contribution G u t = n u wh u t by the initially unskilled. This allocation also describes the behavior of the s at e z during the initial period of activation.
G k t , of which G l t is spent as transfers to the l and the remaining G k t + G l t < G k t is spent on public goods.
The behavior of the agents of group k at their intra-group symmetric optimum is identical to the behavior at the utilitarian solution of the economy which replaces by n s and in which all agents start with the same initial skill h k 0 (see Lemma 14) .
Implementing the intra-group symmetric solution Appendix 8.3.2 shows that given h i 0 = h s t for all i 2 I s and n s h s 0 > w the intra-group …rst best for the s is implemented by
A Pareto-improving tax-transfer scheme
Theorem 7 Consider a persistently polarized feasible allocation z = fc i t ; x i t ; h i t ; G t g i2fu,sg;t 0 . There exists a tax-transfer function implementing a Pareto-improving allocation e z = fe c i t ; e x i t ; e h i t ; e G t g i2fu,sg;t 0
involving an initial transfer to the initially unskilled (e c u t > w e h u t for small t 0) and activation in the sense that all households cross a threshold level of human capital in …nite time and converge to a high stationary level.
Activation is achieved by a negative marginal tax of the initially unskilled u.
After the transitory period of activation the tax implements the (equal-weight) utilitarian solution, such that in the long-run the equilibrium converges to the unique symmetric …rst best allocation.
Note that the Pareto-improving allocations implemented by the proposed tax-transfer scheme need not be Pareto-optimal, an issue which is addressed in Section 6.
Proof:
Step (1): The benchmark (z 0s ; z 0u ) to be beaten. The benchmark (z 0s ; z 0u ) is chosen such that the agents of each group k 2 fu; sg prefer z 0k to every feasible persistently polarized allocation. For the s, the benchmark z 0s is the best intra-group symmetric allocation given (G u0 t ) t 0 de…ned in (14). 8 For the u, the benchmark z 0u grants them the same path of skill as under the given polarized allocation without any e¤ort (h 0u t = h u 0 ) but maximal possible consumption (c 0u t = wh u 0 wh u t ) and provides them with any bounded sequence of public good provision. 9 Note that while (z 0s ; z 0u ) is not a feasible Figure 6 : Implementation allocation, a feasible allocation e z Pareto-dominates any feasible polarized allocation if it dominates (z 0s ; z 0u ) in the sense that e z s z 0s and e z u z 0u .
Step (2): Taxation and behavior (2a) Taxation and behavior of the unskilled during the period of activation t 2 (0; T ):
Consider a low skilled agent in the threshold case of the economy without tax shown in Figure 2 .
The economic and the non-economic motives (m(wh u t ) and bh u t ) together are not strong enough to activate an initially unskilled agent. To amplify the economic motive the tax-transfer scheme raises the marginal impact of skill on disposable income. More precisely, the proposed tax-transfer function
replaces gross income y u t = wh u t by the new disposable income
where is a constant and q t is a time-autonomous term that does not depend on the agent's behavior and where the parameter > 1 measures the elasticity of disposable income with respect to human capital. For > 1, y dis rises faster in h than does wh, which strengthens the economic motive for e¤ort. The general form of the dynamic system summarizing the …rst order conditions of (10) is reducing x s t and G s t and raising c u t .
identical to the dynamic system (4) 
For large we always have a > b a such that the phase diagram am (for t < T ) takes the form of Figure 1b with a decreasing function x _ x=0 (h t ) (see Figure 6 ). The activating tax-transfer scheme is relevant only for t < T . At t = T the system switches to a tax-transfer scheme implementing the solution of the (equal-weight) utilitarian problem (see Step 2c).
Thus for t T the agent follows the well de…ned saddle path determined by the utilitarian solution.
Because instantaneous utility is concave in x the policy function is continuous at T : Given ; h u 0 ; T , an initially unskilled agent chooses e
x u 0 such that the corresponding solution path of the transitory tax-transfer scheme reaches the saddle-path of the utilitarian regime exactly at T . Let e h = e h u T be the corresponding human capital level. Raising shifts up the _ x = 0-isocline (see Figure 6 ) and the optimal e¤ort e x u t (h) for any given h. In particular, for su¢ ciently large, e h = e h u T > h th ut (details in Appendix 8.3.3).
Note that the marginal utility of consumption m h = ht and therefore the dynamic system de…ned by individual optimization problem (10) do not depend on q t : Hence, the time-autonomous term fq t g t 0 does not a¤ect the optimal e¤ort and skill path such that we can determine q t as a function of the optimal path
where c u is a …xed level of consumption assigned to the u during the period of activation. Therefore, at individual optimum (with h u t = e h u t ):
Step 3 such as to make sure that both groups prefer e z to z 0 .
Negative marginal tax for the initially unskilled during the period of transfers. To yield disposable income y dis (h u t ) = w q t (h u t ) the tax-transfer for the u must amount to
. The corresponding marginal tax is
Since along the optimal path h u t = e h u t , the marginal tax along this path is
as long as the u receive a transfer (c u > wh u t ) and possibly longer since > 1. (2b) Taxation and behavior of the s during the transitory period. The tax for the s at t 2 (0; T ) implements the solution of their intra-group symmetric problem (14) given ( e G u t = w e h u t c u ) t 0 as described in Section 5.2.2 and taking into account that at t T , the tax-system implements the (equal-weight) utilitarian solution.
Note that each agent in group s has to pay a transfer for small t ( e G u t = w e h u t c u < 0) and bene…t from the fact that also the u contribute to the public good for larger t ( e G u t = w e h u t c u > 0 for t close to T ). This has no e¤ect on their intra-group optimal fx 0s t ; h 0s t g t as long as n s h s t > w + n u (c u wh u t ). Since c u is small for su¢ ciently small h u 0 this condition is satis…ed if n s h s t > w as in the case without transfer.
(2c) Taxation and behavior after the transitory period of activation. The tax for both groups at t T implements the utilitarian as described in Section 5.2.2. Since e h > h th ut , the u remain activated. Depending on the skills ( e h s T ; e h u T ) at T , the individual paths of e¤ort at utilitarian optimum will in general di¤er for the two groups. In the long-run however, skill and e¤ort converges to the unique symmetric …rst best allocation of an egalitarian society (remember that apart from initial skill, all agents share the same characteristica).
Step 3. Approval by the contributors (3a) By construction, the proposed allocation e z switches to the utilitarian solution as soon as h u t reaches a predetermined level e h > h th ut at T: Compared to the benchmark allocation (z 0s t ) t>T , the utilitarian solution (e z t ) t>T imposes additional e¤ort on the s (as it internalizes the pubic good externality on the u) and provides them with more public goods (including public good provision by the u ).
Obviously, for h u T = h s T the utilitarian solution (then unique …rst best symmetric allocation) is better for the s then the benchmark. By continuity it follows that this is also true if h u T = e h is su¢ ciently close to h s T , which is satis…ed for su¢ ciently large . This guarantees that fe z s t g t T s fz 0s t g t T . (3b) For e z s z 0s it remains to make sure that (e z s t ) t<T s (z 0s t ) t<T . Since fe c s t ; e x s t ; e h s t g t<T = fc 0s t ; x 0s t ; h 0s t g t<T and felicity is linear with respect to (G t ) t this amounts to guarantee that the present value of public good provision till T is larger under e z than under z 0 (i.e.
. Because fe c s t ; e h s t g t<T = fc 0s t ; h 0s t g t<T , the contribution of the s to the public budget (G s t plus transfers to the s) is also the same under the two regimes such that
is su¢ cient for e z s s z 0s : Note that the u will only be willing to activate if in exchange they receive a transfer for small t when their pre-transfer income still is very small. This means that their initial contribution to public good provision e G u t = w e h u t e c u is negative. This initial reshu-ing of public expenditures from public good provision toward social welfare is attractive for the s if e h u t rises su¢ ciently fast to turn the initial transfer into a positive net contribution soon enough to satisfy Condition (18). Appendix 8.3.3(3b) shows that one can always choose high enough to guarantee that the speed of skill accumulation b e h u t is larger than the discount rate . A su¢ cient condition for (18) than is that the private consumption e c u = c u (speci…ed in Equation (35)) assigned to the u during the transitory period of activation is not too generous.
Step 4. Approval by the bene…ciary. If h u 0 is very small, consumption c u t wh u 0 at the polarized allocation z is very small as well. The marginal utility of consumption and therefore the bene…t of even a small transfer is very large. More precisely, the appendix shows that lim h u
On the other hand, given , e¤ort is bounded by x := a , such that the cost of e¤ort is
. Therefore e z u u z 0u for small h u 0 . If initially, h u 0 is not su¢ ciently small, the beginning of the transfer payment is delayed accordingly.
6 Discussion and Extensions 6.1 Discussion of the assumptions 1. Human capital. While the variable "years of education" satis…es the basic requirements the present paper imposes on human capital (it generates income, is a direct source of utility, and is acquired with e¤ort), 10 the term human capital is used here in a broader sense, inspired by psychology literature concerned with human needs as determinants of behavior and subjective well-being (SWB). Summarizing previous empirical work on Maslow's in ‡uential hierarchical 1 0 Studies by the US Census Bureau and many other agencies have consistently shown that people with a higher level of education earn more money than those with less education and it has also been shown that this higher level of annual earnings translates into signi…cant increases in overall lifetime earnings. Furthermore, Witter et al. [1984] "found that education is signi…cantly positively related to positive subjective well-being (SWB). While the contribution of education to SWB is relatively small in Witter et al. [1984] , Blanch ‡ower and Oswald [2004] …nd that the non-economic variables in happiness equations, in particular education enter with large coe¢ cients, relative to that of income. In particular, "education is playing a role independently on income." theory of needs [Maslow 1943] , 11 Mitchell and Moudgill [1974] propose a two-step hierarchy of human needs. Similarly, Wahba and Bridwell [1976] …nd "that a dual level hierarchy of needs may provide a viable alternative to Maslow's multilevel need hierarchy." They suggest that human needs can be categorized as either maintenance needs or growth needs (including mastery, respect, self-direction and autonomy). Diener and Tay [2011] conduct a comprehensive and globally representative empirical study on needs and SWB and …nd strong evidence that the ful…llment of a list of needs including the above-mentioned maintenance and growth needs derived from Maslow [1943] is closely and consistently associated with SWB. Using the terms of Wahba and Bridwell [1976] , consumption of the present article satis…es maintenance needs while the state variable human capital satis…ed growth needs.
Speci…c class of felicity functions
(a) Additive separability. Diener and Tay [2011] …nd "substantial independence in the e¤ects of needs on SWB" and conclude "that the individual-level needs were primarily additive in their association with SWB." This is re ‡ected in the additive separability of u with respect to c and h. The additive separability with respect to e¤ort is standard in models where e¤ort, leisure or hours worked enter the felicity function. To otherwise keep the in ‡uence of x and G as simple as possible, they also enter instantaneous utility in an additively separable way.
(b) The hierarchy of needs. A central aspect of Maslow's hierarchical theory of needs (Maslow [1943] ) was the deprivation/domination proposition, which hypothesized that the deprivation of an important need will lead to the domination of this need. Wahba and Bridwell [1976] review evidence indicating that the deprivation/domination proposition is relevant when maintenance needs, but not when growth needs, are deprived. An elegant way to phrase these results in standard terms of economic modeling and consistent with (a) is to require that m(c) satis…es the Inada-condition for small c (lim c!0 m 0 (c) = 1) with m 0 (c) > 0, m 00 (c) < 0, while f 0 (h) is neither particularly large for small h nor decreasing with h. This is formulation is also compatible with Diener and Tay [2011] , who …nd that although di¤erent needs a¤ect SWB in an additive way, "people tend to achieve maintenance needs before other needs."The simplest functional form satisfying these requirements is (2) with m(c) = ln c (where measures the strength of the economic motive for e¤ort) and 
Income and expenditures.
The assumption c = wh combines two strong simpli…cations:
(a) Perfect substitutes. First, individual productivity and income wh are proportional to human capital at the exogenous rate w. As in the theories of Loury [1981] , Becker and Tomes [1979] , and much subsequent literature, human capital is reduced to a homogeneous variable h measured in terms of the same unit of e¢ ciency for all agents. Di¤erent levels of human capital are perfect substitutes in the production of output. Apart from simplifying the model, this excludes one source of persistent inequality which arises when a strictly positive supply of di¤ erent types of human capital (occupations) is essential for producing any output (see for instance Mookherjee and Ray [2003] ). (a) The e¤ectiveness of e¤ort. As in models including learning by doing, the current level of human capital in each period is determined by the sum of the past depreciated e¤orts of the agent. In other words, the growth rate of h depends positively on the current expended e¤ort. An essential assumption for the existence of multiple stationary optima is that the e¤ectiveness dg=dx of e¤ort in raising human capital does not decrease with a rising h.
The simplest functional form satisfying this requirement is (3), which assumes that the e¤ectiveness of e¤ort is independent from h. 13 1 2 For the distributional issues at the heart of much of this literature as well as of the present paper, it is essential that the multiplicity occurs at the level of individual optimization. In the present paper, the optimization problem of one person has multiple optimal steady states given the behavior of others. There is much literature where multiplicity of stationary solutions only occurs on an aggregate level (e.g., Skiba [1978] , Davidson and Harris [1981] , Dechert and Nishimura [1983] , Ladron-de-Guevara et al. [1999] ) or at the level of local interactions within neighborhoods or regions (e.g., Durlauf (1996) , Benabou (1996) , and Galor and Tsiddon (1997)). 1 3 Note that this entails that the absolute e¤ectiveness d _ h=dx = h of e¤ort increases with the skill level. Formally equivalent one could assume that e¤ort is the less unpleasant, the more one knows: u(c; e ¤o rt h ; h; G) and _ h = e¤ort h 2 : If we de…ne x := e ¤o rt h as relative e¤ort, this leads to the maximization problem (1).
(b) Depreciation. The depreciation rate h is an increasing (rather than constant) function of h merely to exclude the possibility of unbounded growth. The threshold dynamics also occur with the more standard accumulation rule. The di¤erence to the present formulation would be that the strictly positive attractor of h would would be bounded in the case of a household that starts above the threshold, while it is bounded here.
Introducing a credit market
Consider the base line model of Section 3. A strong assumption of the basic maximization problem
(1) is that, in every period, each agent consumes his entire labor income. In particular, an unskilled and poor agent is not able to borrow money today, even when this allows him to accumulate skill and raise his income. This assumption is not decisive for the possibility of threshold dynamics. Consider an economy with agents i 2 [0; 1] and with …nancial wealth. The individual optimization problem of agent i adds a second state variable k i t ? 0 to (1) and replaces the constraint
where r t is the interest rate. The initial state now is an h i 0 0 as before and in addition a k i 0 ? 0. To concentrate on the simplest case, assume that
Agents may di¤er in their parameters except for the discount rate. Thanks to the perfect credit market, the agent is able to perfectly smooth his consumption. Given r t = it is optimal to do so, i.e. to choose a constant c. For any given c, the adjoint equation for the costate variable of h together with the accumulation rule for h exactly de…ne the dynamic system (4) (taking into account that m h = dm(c(h)) dc dc dh = wm c ). Stationary k requires 0 = _ k t = r t k t + wh t c t , or, with constant h t = h; c t = c, k t = 0, and r t = that wh = c. Thus for initial …nancial wealth k 0 = 0, the stationary optima x; h; c to the problem with …nancial wealth have to solve the same three equations of the problem without …nancial wealth.
Proposition 8 shows that the set of stationary optima is robust with respect to the introduction of …nancial wealth and the removal of borrowing constraints (given k i 0 = 0 for all i). The treatment of the complete dynamics with two state variables goes beyond the scope of the present paper. It would add an interesting second dimension: The interplay between …nancial wealth and human capital. The complete set of stationary optima in this economy (even given constant r t = ) is of course much larger than the subset described in the proposition, since it is not restricted to zero initial …nancial wealth for the individual agent. Most importantly, one can show that the possession of initial wealth k i 0 > 0 -far from eliminating the path dependence of individual behavior -reinforces it. Higher initial wealth reduces the economic motive of an unskilled household to invest (non-monetary) e¤ort to raise its human capital. Case 1 is then excluded. In fact, the e¤ect of strictly positive initial …nancial wealth on the behavior of unskilled agents is very similar to the e¤ect of a monetary transfer studied in Section 4.
Pareto-optimal Pareto-improvement, talent-slavery and income rank reversal
The tax-transfer system advocated in the proof of Theorem 7 generates long-run equality between agents that only di¤er in their initial skill endowment. It does so by raising both the present value utility U i 0 of every individual (it induces a Pareto-improvement upon the initial intertemporal allocation) and the long-run felicity u i t of every individual as well. However, the allocation implemented in the proof of Theorem 7 is in general not (ex ante) Pareto-optimal. 14 A natural question therefore arises: What would a Pareto-optimal Pareto-improvement over the polarized allocation look like (and which tax-function would implement such an allocation)?
Equal-weight utilitarian welfare freezes social class a¢ liation and involves talent slavery of the initially skilled. As has been noted, the (equal-weight) utilitarian allocation (applied at t 0 rather than at t T ) is Pareto-optimal but does not Pareto-improve over a polarized allocation.
For h u 0 < h th ut , the Samaritan's Dilemma is "solved" in favor of disactivating transfer. While the allocation constructed in the proof of Theorem 7 provides transitory transfers to the poor only at the cost of additional e¤ort, the (equal-weight) utilitarian planner provides immediate and persistent transfers and comfort. Aiming at narrowing the distance between ex ante (dynastic) utilities (U i 0 ), the equal-weight utilitarian solution freezes initial social class a¢ liation and raises the distance between classes in terms of skill, economic capacity and long-run felicity. For the initially skilled this means that instead of paying a transfer only for a transitory period to enjoy higher public good provision in the future, they have to pay perpetual transfers without ever getting anything in return. Worse still, they are persistently forced to exert higher e¤ort and sustain higher skill than under their symmetric intra-group best solution. This is a form of what has been called talent slavery 15 in the literature and which has been rejected by political philosophers and legal scholars alike. 16 General utilitarian welfare, if it activates the initially unskilled involves income rank reversal in the long-run. If an initially polarized society wants to overcome activation in a way approved by all involved groups it cannot resort to the equal-weight utilitarian solution. In the search for a Pareto-optimal Pareto-improvement over a polarized allocation it is natural then, to turn to the more general utilitarian problem of maximizing the weighted sum of individual utility for all vector of weights in the unit simplex (This problem is formally de…ned in Appendix 8.3.1 as it allows to subsume the equal-weight utilitarian problem and the intra-group symmetric problem under a same maximization problem). A companion paper (Funk [2015] ) deals with the set of utilitarian welfare optima in more detail.
The smaller an agent's weight, say the u's weight p u , the smaller her share in total consumption, the larger her p-optimal e¤ort (given h u t ) and her upper stationary h (p u ) and the smaller the threshold h th (p u ) (with lim p k !0 h th (p u ) = 0). In particular, the u can be activated for any h u 0 > 0 by choosing a su¢ ciently small p u guaranteeing h th (p u ) < h u 0 . Thus, since the solution to any p-planner-problem is Pareto-optimal, an activating Pareto-optimal allocation always exists. However, in contrast to the allocation advocated in Section 5.2.3, a utilitarian solution assigning a small weight p u to the u, necessary to activate them when they are still unskilled, will continue to do so when h u t has grown beyond the threshold h th of section 2, beyond the threshold of the equal-weight utilitarian solution h th ut and will even continue to further activate the u when their skill h u t has overtaken the skill h s t of the initially high skilled s. In the long-run, the u are forced to exert higher e¤ort and sustain larger skill than the s (x (p u ) > x (p s ) for p u < p s ). At the same time, a small p u entails low consumption not only initially (when c u is essentially …nanced by the s) but persistently. Thus after a transitory period of catching up, the u will for ever consume less than the s while they must persistently exert more e¤ort and generate more income. In the long-run the corresponding utilitarian solution entails a persistent reversal of pre-tax and post-tax income ordering. Activating utilitarian redistribution persistently reverses the cross-sectional ranking of disposable income (the larger an agent's pre-tax income, the smaller her after tax income). Furthermore, it is not guaranteed that a there exists a utilitarian optimum which Pareto-dominates the Pareto-ine¢ cient allocation of Section 5.2.3. In fact, Funk [2015] also shows, that the set of utilitarian welfare optima in general strictly smaller than the set of Pareto-Optima. 17 Funk [2015] therefore introduces a more general welfare criterion. Although the set of corresponding optima contains allocations neither contained in the set of utilitarian optima nor Pareto-dominated by any utilitarian optimum, the conclusions about talent slavery and income rank reversal remain the same:
If the initial distribution of skill is su¢ ciently dispersed, than all corresponding optima are subject to talent slavery or income rank reversal.
Conclusion
As Gary Becker (Becker [1993] ) already noted, ignoring human capital as a direct source of satisfaction or more generally, as a source of non-economic returns, quantitatively underestimates the total return of investment in human capital and therefore underestimates the motivation to invest. This paper has shown that it also alters the qualitative nature of the interaction of human capital, the investment in human capital and the economic return of human capital. Imposing the standard Inada conditions for consumption, but not for human capital -an assumption in line with psychology literature on subjective well-being -the intertemporal individual household problem has multiple solutions and threshold dynamics occur when the economic motive for e¤ort is too weak to activate the agent for low levels of human capital and while the non-economic motive for e¤ort remains strong for high levels of human capital. The critical strength of the non-economic motive above which the threshold case occurs increases with the agents's impatience, the rate of depreciation and the cost of e¤ort and decreases with rising e¤ectiveness of e¤ort.
The fact that the multiplicity of solutions originates at the level of individual optimization rather than through the interaction between individuals is crucial for the distributional issues at the center of this paper. Its occurrence on the individual level makes it a source of inequality or polarization within a society. It is the fact that the individual faces a threshold given the behavior of others which makes loans or simple transfers ine¤ective and conditional transfers (or a negative marginal income taxes) e¤ective in activating the individual.
In an economy without externality, any market equilibria -segregated or not -is Pareto-optimal.
The unskilled only remain unskilled when this is optimal for them. And the rich have no incentive 1 7 This applies in particular for or small h u 0 and small p u (the relevant case for activating agents with low initial skill). For small p u the su¢ cient condition guaranteeing a continuous policy function x(h) in the present setting (see Appendix 8.1) is violated. The companion paper gives su¢ cient conditions under which the p-optimal policy function is not continuous (and not uniquely de…ned) at the threshold h th (p u ), which in turn leads to a non-convex set of feasible pairs (U u 0 ; U s 0 ) of present value utility given the initial h0.
to pay a transfer (conditional or not). However even in the absence of externalities, redistribution -although not Pareto-improving -will evoke less resistance by the contributors if conditioned on activation, since this limits their transfer payments to a transitory period. A policy that both feeds and activates …nds a compromise between bene…ciary and contributors by reducing the future number of the needy.
The case for conditional redistribution is more compelling even when there is a su¢ ciently strong common interest in the education of the poor. As we have seen, an appropriate activating welfare scheme then Pareto-improves upon any persistently polarized allocation. In the present paper such a common interest arises due to the presence of public goods that are the easier to …nance as the number of skilled and contributing households increase. The conclusions concerning Pareto-improving activating welfare remain valid if the material advantage the rich derive from the education of the poor is replaced (or reinforced) by more paternalistic motives (a dislike for extreme poverty, for low education, or for lost opportunities, or, more speci…cally, a willingness to support those that try to help themselves).
The concrete tax-transfer scheme proposed in the proof of Theorem 7 describes an activating Pareto-improving policy but does not lead to a Pareto-optimal allocation. In fact, we have seen that Pareto-optimal activation leads to a negative cross-sectional relation between earned income and after tax income. The concrete tax-transfer scheme, by generating long-run equality between agents that only di¤er in their initial skill endowment, solves the con ‡ict between ex-ante Pareto-optimality and exclusion of persistent talent slavery in favor of the latter.
The paper has emphasized the possibility of persistent inequality among inherently equal households. The poor are poor due to unfavorable initial conditions. Granting the importance of inherent heterogeneity in reality does not much alter the conclusions: If within a group of otherwise identical households not all are initially positioned at the same side of the threshold, then this group will eventually become completely segregated into two separate subgroups, one relatively unskilled and poor and one relatively skilled and rich. It is true that in a world with (inherently) heterogeneous agents the argument for conditional transfers applies even when all individual optimization problems have unique stationary solutions: Strongly motivated and skilled may be willing to pay for the activation of less motivated types because this increases the future funding of public goods. However, without multiplicity of stationary optima, such transfers have to be paid permanently, since the unskilled are unskilled for immutable reasons when households mainly di¤er by …xed characteristics (their types). 18
In contrast, when human capital is a state variable that can be changed over time, a low-skill trap, even if individually optimal, can in principle be permanently surmounted. It is the possibility of rais- Stability of the interior stationary solutions to (4) The determinant of associated Jacobian of the system (6) at the non-zero stationary solutions is det J(h 1;2 ) = p
where det J(h th ) > 0 and det J(h ) < 0. Therefore h th is unstable (whenever it exists, thus in Case 2) and h is saddle-point stable (whenever it exists, thus in Cases 1 and 2).
Stability of the trivial stationary solution to (4) The determinant of the associated Jacobian of the system (6) at the steady state with zero ability (h = 0; x ) is det J(h ) = a : In Case 1 det J(h ) > 0 and the trivial steady state (h ; x ) is unstable and in Cases 2 and 3 det J(h ) < 0 such that the trivial steady state h = 0 is a saddle point.
The transversality condition The necessary transversality condition for (1) is lim t!1 e t t h t = 0: Inserting the FOC lim t!1 e t vx h h t = lim t!1 e t vx = lim t!1 e t a+ x = lim t!1 e t x . Any path satisfying (4) and converging to one of the three possible stationary solutions (including these stationary solutions) satisfy the transversality condition lim t!1 e t x = 0 since in all these cases fjx t jg t is bounded. In contrast, it can be shown that any path starting o¤ the proposed policy function satisfying (4) violates the transversality condition. Hartl et al. [2004] show that if the unstable stationary solution lies in the concave domain of the Hamiltonian, then this stationary solution is a node of the dynamic system and the policy function x(h) is continuous across all three stationary states as drawn in Figure 2 . Generating the three cases by a variation of a Proposition 9 If the economic motive for e¤ ort is not dominated by the economic motive (b > + 2 : at h = 0, x _ x=0 (h) increases with a slope higher than x _ h=0 (h)), then a variation of the simple cost of e¤ ort from a su¢ ciently low to a su¢ ciently large value generates all three cases:
Su¢ cient conditions
For small a all households converge to the same strictly positive level of human capital (see Figure   1a ); for intermediate a the threshold case prevails (see Figure 2) ; for large a all households choose a path towards increasing passivity (see Figure 3 ). There are never multiple stationary solutions to the individual household problem if the non-economic motive for e¤ ort is too weak. Formally: If b < + a then threshold dynamics occurs for no . If b < + 2 then it occurs for no a.
Proof. Consider Figures 1 to 3 of Section 3. If at h = 0 the slope of _ x = 0-isocline is larger than the slope or the _ h = 0-isocline (formally if d dh x _ x=0 (0) = ( b ) 2 > = d dh x _ h=0 (0) or if b > 2 + ), then a variation of the (simple) cost of e¤ort a can generate all 3 cases. This is again best seen by considering the diagrams: In Figure 1a . Case 3a occurs if a is larger than this solution. It is obvious from the …gure that if at h = 0 the slope of _ x = 0-isocline is smaller than the slope or the _ h = 0-isocline ( d dh (x _ x=0 (0)) < d dh x _ h=0 (0) or b < + 2 ), then the threshold case (Case 2) occurs for no level of e¤ort costs a.
Appendix: Simple Transfers
Apart from the stationary state at h = 0 the new dynamic system (9) For later reference, I solve the more general p-utilitarian problem which generalizes the (equalweight) (11) to
i t for all t 0, i 2 I for weights p = p i i2I 0; R i2I p i di = 1 and given (h i 0 ) i2I : The equal-weight utilitarian problem is the special case with p i = 1 for all i 2 I. (19) is equivalent to solving a static and a dynamic problem:
Lemma 12 Solving
(a) Static planner problem: Given fe x i t ; e h i t g i;t , the consumption allocation fe c i t ; e G t g i;t maximizes H(x; h; G; ) is concave if D 1 0 (satis…ed), D 2 0 and D 3 0.
. Thus, the Hamiltonian is concave at the smaller inner solution of FOC i¤ x(h 1 (p i )) a or i¤ h 1 (p i ) a .
For the equal-weight problem with p i = 1, condition (28) guarantees the existence of a threshold (since b + w > b + n s w > (2 p a+ ( +a )) 2 ). If in addition for h 1 (p i = 1) > a , the Hamiltonian of the equal-weight problem is concave at h 1 (p i = 1) and it follows that the unstable stationary solution h 1 (p i = 1) of (21) is a node and the policy function is continuous across all three stationary states. 21
While the main text, in particular …gures 5 and 6, implicitly make these assumptions, 22 Section 6 and
